The new Arab way of war
It is always refreshing to see intellectual honesty concerning the matters of war between Western civilization and the Arab Islamic extremists. A fine example of this is Captain Peter Layton's article in the March 2003 issue of Proceedings, published by the Naval Institute. Captain Layton, of the Royal Australian Air Force, dares to broach subjects heretofore considered taboo in the West's fight against the radical forces of the Middle East. And, considering that the article was published over a year ago, his conclusions have been remarkably accurate on several issues.
For example, Captain Layton examines the role of assassins and their local supporters as a way to circumvent the superior conventional armies of the West:
The new Arab way of war is parasitic. Local supporters acquire weapons and explosives, provide safe houses, arrange transportation, and steal or hire vehicles. Assassins fly in, carry out attacks, and fly out quickly, avoiding arrest. Relying completely on local sources, they can strike deep into the Western heartlands, mimicking the strategic air attacks characteristic of the West.
In a way, Captain Layton has taken a lesson from Tom Clancy and his novel Patriot Games. Arguably one of Clancy's poorer books, it nevertheless discussed in detail the support structure necessary to enable the IRA terrorists access to the US homeland, and to enable them to circumvent tough security measures to carry out their attack. The politically correct crowd would, of course, have nothing to do with the depictions of left—wing groups as abettors of terrorism, so this aspect of the operation was expunged from the movie version.
Captain Layton dares to go into the one critical issue of this type of warfare that the mainstream press avoids like the plague: the clash of religions.
Middle Eastern societies frequently criticize the immoral and lax ethical stance of the secular and materialist West. It is ironic that their chosen way of war makes their assassins appear immoral and unprincipled, which may be why their commanders seek not to identify themselves. Anonymity provides safety from accusations of moral bankruptcy.
And there it is in a nutshell. How is it then, that not one Imam of any mosque in the US has come forward and condemned the attacks of 9—11, or any of the suicide bombers in Israel? Again, the mainstream media gives this glaring omission a pass.
He again discusses a subject that has received a lot of lip service in the last decade, but which only the current President has seen fit to do anything about: the nuclear option in response to a WMD attack on an American or Western city. It has long been NATO policy to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact chemical or biological attack. Our nuclear first use policy was also in effect in Gulf War I.
But Captain Layton's suggestion that we clearly communicate the threat of 'graduated nuclear response' will not currently work. The US has no tactical nuclear capability, since the dismantling of those weapons in the 1990s, during the Clinton Administration. The only 'graduated response' would be a 'non—strategic' cruise missile with a warhead of hundreds of kilotons in yield. Fortunately, and to the dismay of the anti—American left, President Bush has started development of a new class of tactical nuclear weapons that would give us a true graduated response capability.
Captain Layton's piece has a few misconceptions. For example, the 'New Arab Way of War' is not really new, but is a natural response that has been repeated time and again in the aftermath of Arab armies' numerous defeats on the conventional battlefield. We see a rise in terrorist and assassin operations after the defeat of Egypt and Syria in the 1973 Arab—Israeli War, the defeat of modern Syrian T—72s by older Israeli M48A5s in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, and the defeat of Iraq by the Coalition in 1991 and 2003.
The author can be forgiven these few errors, because he discusses the core issues, and possible solutions, of defeating this style of warfare. In fact, this manner of warfare is exactly what has evolved in Iraq since Saddam's statue came tumbling down in Baghdad in April of last year. Deprived of a victory against superior Western armies, the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard conducted a skillful strategic retreat behind a screen line of fanatic Fedayeen and foreign fighters. As the Coalition literally slaughtered these fanatics, the Iraqi Army melted into the cities and towns, and prepared to fight the Arab way of war.
Posted by Doug 04 22 04