In an excellent article  in National Review Online, Michael Ledeen writes about one aspect of the so—called 'insurgency' in Iraq that readers of AT have known for some time: that the enemy consists of forces trained, led, and financed by the militaries and intelligence services of Iraq's neighbors in the Central Region.

Ledeen critiques the shortsightedness of our intelligence community and the seeming lack of long—range military operations to counter the foreign supported guerilla war in Iraq.  He writes,

The clear strategic conclusion remains what it should have been long before Coalition troops entered Saddam's evil domain:  No matter how strongly we wish it to be otherwise, we are engaged in a regional war, of which Iraq is but a single battlefield.  The war cannot be won in Iraq alone, because the enemy is based throughout the region and his bases and headquarters are located beyond our current reach.  His power is directly proportional to our unwillingness to see the true nature of the war, and our decision to limit the scope of our campaign.

This reinforces my piece from over two months ago where I conclude exactly the same thing, based upon our victories in Najaf, Sadr City, and the Sunni Triangle.  I also detailed the intelligence failures during the 90s in the Central Region which contributed to a flawed understanding of the enemy situation in the CENTCOM area of responsibility prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Some of my key findings:

The notion of some mysterious and nebulous network of fanatical Muslim extremists exciting the general populace of Iraq (or any other Muslim country) to a general uprising must be critically examined, and ultimately relegated to the trash heap, or our perceptions of 'how to fight' will be clouded by myth and innuendo.

We now know that the latest battle for Najaf was fought largely with Iranian—financed mercenaries, who, it was determined, were criminals that Saddam had released from prison just before Operation Iraqi Freedom in March of 2003.  The recent fighting in Sadr City  is no different.

And that,

The average Middle East male does not know how to train, equip, and control a fire team, much less synchronize so—called 'uprisings' scattered around the major cities of Najaf, Sadr City, and Fallujah.  These anti—Coalition forces are the product of state—run military and intelligence services, without whom these street thugs would be totally at a loss.

In addition to the recent series of conventional battles that have occurred in Iraq, there have also been paramilitary operations which include urban 'guerilla' warfare,  subversion and sabotage of key facilities, especially disruption of the port facilities where oil is distributed, and kidnappings and assassination.

And finally:

Securing Iraq without tackling the basis of support of the enemy in the theater is like attempting to liberate France in WW II without bombing the hell out of Germany.

Doug Hanson  12—28—04