Below is a transcription of the purported after action reports recently unearthed by "The Point." If authentic, this material is very significant in that it confirms many of the claims made by John O'Neil in "Unfit For Command" and other Swift boat veterans' account of the day and contradicts much of what Kerry and his defenders have claimed.
 
UPDATE: The New York Post reports that a senior Navy official has confirmed the authenticity of the material

FURTHER UPDATE: from ABC News' The Note:
 
"A newly surfaced document from John Kerry's Navy record says he shot a lone, wounded enemy who was running away in the incident that led to his Silver Star, his highest military decoration," writes Deborah Orin of the New York Post .

More: "The after—action report was obtained from the Navy archives by syndicated TV commentator Mark Hyman of "The Point." A Navy official confirmed its authenticity." LINK

The Kerry campaign's reaction: "It's crap."

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

CONFIDENTIAL

5. SEALORDS 27B

6. UNITS ENTERED SONG BAY HAP AT 1003H AND PROCEEDED TOWARD RENDEZVOUS AT CAI NUOC. AT VQ 945752, AREA FROM WHICH UNITS WERE AMBUSHED PREVIOUS NIGHT, (MY 2725452) PCF 94 AND 23 BEACHED AND PLACED LANDING PARTIES ASHORE TO RECON AREA WHILE PCF 43 PROVIDED COVER IN RIVER. LANDING PARTIES DISCOVERED TWO FRESHLY DUG SPIDER HOLES

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WITH MANY SPENT ROUNDS OF AK 47 AND CARBINE IN THE AREA.

LOT 13 BLEW 2 LARGE OFFENSIVE BUNKERS. UNITS THEN PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TO CAI NUOC LOCATION WITHOUT INCIDENT. RFPF TROOPS WERE EMBARKED, 30 MEN IN EACH PCF, AND UNITS DEPARTED ENROUTE INSERTION POINT AT VQ 984832. AT VQ 982818 UNITS WERE TAKEN UNDER HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE. OTC CALLED FOR ALL UNITS TO TURN INTO FIRE AND BEACH. UNITS RESPONSE WAS IMMEDIATE AND PCF'S CHARGED AMBUSH COMPLETELY THROWING ENEMY OFF GUARD. SURPRISE RUSH ON AMBUSH SITE CAUSED VC TO STAND UP AND RUN. PCF 23 AND 43 ACCOUNTED FOR 3 KIA (VC) BEFORE TROOPS WERE LANDED. WITH SUBSEQUENT INSERTION OF TROOPS, ENEMY WAS OVERRUN. 3 CHINESE COMMUNIST RIFLES WERE CAPTURED 20 YARDS FROM PCF'S. LANDING PARTIES FROM BEACHED UNITS PROCEEDED TO SWEEP IMMEDIATE AREA AND DESTROYED 2 STRUCTURES WHILE RFPF MOVE INLAND IN PURSUIT OF ENEMY. WHILE TROOPS CONDUCTED SWEEP, PCF 94 AND 23 [MOVED UP RIVER] TOWARDS AREA FROM WHICH ARMY ADVISOR REPORTED GUNSHOTS. PCF 43 REMAINED AT ORIGINAL AMBUSH SITE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR TROOPS. PCF 94 AND 23 PROCEEDED TO VQ 984831 AND THEN TURNED TO RETURN TO PCF 43 LOCATION. AT VQ 984830 [B—4E] ROCKET EXPLODED IN WATER CLOSE ABOARD PCF 94 BLOWING OUT WINDOW FRAME. BOTH UNITS RECEIVED HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE AND OTC AGA CALLED UNITS TO TURN INTO FIRE AND CHARGE AMBUSH SITE. PCF 43 WAS C [UNREADABLE]

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AND MOVED IMMEDIATELY TO ASSIST. PCF 94 BEACHED IN CENTER OF AMBUSH IN FRONT OF SMALL PATH WHEN VC SPRUNG UP FROM BUNKER 10 FEET FROM UNIT. MAN RAN WITH WEAPON TOWARDS HOOTCH, FORWARD M—60 GUNNER WOUNDED MAN IN LEG. OINC JUMPED ASHORE AND GAVE PURSUIT WHILE OTHER UNITS SATURATED AREA WITH FIRE AND BEACHED PLACING ASSAULT PARTIES ASHORE. OINC OF PCF 94 CHASED VC INLAND BEHIND HOOTCH AND SHOT HIM WHILE HE FLED CAPTURING ONE B—40 ROCKET LAUNCHER WITH ROUND IN CHAMBER. OINC'S OF PCF'S 43 AND 23 LED ASSAULT PARTIES THROUGH BRUSH AND JOINED WITH PCF 94 GROUP. PARTIES FR[O]M 3 ACF'S [PRO]CEEDED TO SWEEP AREA AND [ILLEGIBLE] 431 .6 BWFQ HEQZ FEB 69. UNITS REMAINED IN AMBUSH AREA AT LENGTH DUE TO SIZE AND IMPORTANCE OF AREA OVERRUN. RFPF ADVISOR CALLED FOR MORTAR SUPPORT TO SUPPRESS SNIPER FIRE. PCF 43 PROVIDED MORTAR WITH LIGHT MINE 36 SPOTTING. PCF 43'S QUICK AND ACCURATE RESPONSE WAS DESCRIBE BY LIGHT MINE 36 AS INSTRUMENTAL IN SUPPRESSING FIRE AND ALLOWING RFPF'S TO MOVE AHEAD AND ROUT ENEMY. WHILE PCF 43 PROVIDE MORTAR SUPPORT, PCF 94 AND 23 ASSAULT PARTIES RECONNED TO VQ 985835 WHERE 3 VC WHERE OBSERVED RUNNING FROM THEM OUT OF FIRING RANGE. ASSAULT PARTY COULD NOT [G]IVE PURSUIT DUE TO PROXIMITY OF MORTAR ROUNDS PASSING OVERHEAD. UGT 13 PERSONNEL PLACED CHARGEXS IN

MAJOR BUNKERS [AND RICE] BINS AND PROVIDED MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION POSSIBLE. ASSAULT PARTIES THEN RENDEZVOUSED WITH RFPF AND UNITS PROCEEDED TO CLEAR AREA. WHILE BACKING AWAY FROM BEACH, SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM OPPOSITE BANK. FIRE WAS SUPPRESSED AND ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CHIEU HOI SNIPERS. RESULTS NEGATIVE AND MORE SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS RECEIVED. UNITS AGAIN [SUPPRESSED]  [ILLEGIBLE]

TO CAI NUOC LOCATION WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. TROOPS WERE DISEMBARKED AND UNITS DEPARTED AREA. WHILE EXITING SONG BAY HAP UNITS RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM VQ 960765 AND VQ 965765. UNITS TURNED AND MADE TWO STRAFING RUNS ON LOCATION, SUPPRESSING FIRE, AND THEN CLEARED RIVER WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AREA OF SECOND AMBUSH WHERE PCF'S ROUTED VC AND LANDED ASSAULT PARTIES WAS OF CONSIDDERABLE TACTICAL IMPORTANCE. AREA WAS MAJOR VC SUPPLY POINT AND WAYSTATION FOR INFILTRATION. BUNKERS DISCOVERED ALMOST ONE MILE INLAND BY PCF ASSAULT PARTIES REVEALED MANY BUNDLES OF CLOTHING WRAPPED IN WATERPROOF PACKETS. CONSTRUCTION OF COMPOUND SHOWED MUCH PLANNING FOR EFFICIENT PRODUCTION OF SUPPLY MATERIALS AND PERIMETER DEFENSE. BELIEVE FIRST AMBUSH WAS DESIGNED TO KEEP UNITS OUT OF AREA BUT PCF TACTICS NEGATED VC EFFORTS. STRONGLY RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL SWEEP IN AREA WITH LHFT SUPPORT. ROUNDS EXPENDED 7002 .50 CAL, 6000 M—60, 40 81MM HE.

2912252 FEB 69

Now compare this purported after action report with what John O'Neil and his fellow SBVFT have claimed:
 
In the book, O'Neill writes "Kerry's Star would never have been awarded had his actions been reviewed through normal channels. In his case, he was awarded the medal two days after the incident with no review. The medal was arranged to boost the morale of Coastal Division 11, but it was based on false and incomplete information provided by Kerry himself."

The Silver Star citation says Kerry was in command of a three—boat mission on the Dong Cung River. As the boats approached the target area, they came under intense enemy fire. Kerry ordered his boat to attack and all boats opened fire. He then beached directly in front of the enemy ambushers. In the battle that followed, the crews captured enemy weapons. His boat then moved further up the river to suppress more enemy fire. A rocket exploded near Kerry's boat, and he ordered to charge the enemy. Kerry beached his boat 10 feet from the rocket position and led a landing party ashore to pursue the enemy.

Kerry' citation reads: "The extraordinary daring and personal courage of Lt. Kerry in attacking a numerically superior force in the face of intense fire were responsible for the highly successful mission."

But O'Neill writes: "According to Kerry's crewman Michael Madeiros, Kerry had an agreement with him to turn the boat in and onto the beach if fired upon. Each of the three boats involved in the operation was involved in the agreement."

One crewman even recalls a discussion of probable medals, according to O'Neill.

The event was recounted to O'Neill by a pro—Kerry Army veteran, Doug Reese.

"Far from being alone, the boats were loaded with many soldiers commanded by Reese and two other advisors. When fired at, Reese's boat —— not Kerry's —— was the first to beach in the ambush zone. Then Reese and other troops and advisors (not Kerry) disembarked, killing a number of Viet Cong and capturing a number of weapons. None of the participants from Reese's boat received Silver Stars."

O'Neill continues: "Kerry's boat moved slightly downstream and was struck by a rocket—propelled grenade. ... A young Viet Cong in a loincloth popped out of a hole, clutching a grenade launcher, which may or may not have been loaded. ... Tom Belodeau, a forward gunner, shot the Viet Cong with an M—60 machine gun in the leg as he fled. ... Kerry and Medeiros (who had many troops in their boat) took off, perhaps with others, and followed the young Viet Cong and shot him in the back, behind a lean to."

O'Neill concludes "Whether Kerry's dispatching of a fleeing, wounded, armed or unarmed teenage enemy was in accordance with the customs of war, it is very clear that many Vietnam veterans and most Swiftees do not consider this action to be the stuff of which medals of any kind are awarded; nor would it even be a good story if told in the cold details of reality. There is no indication that Kerry ever reported that the Viet Cong was wounded and fleeing when dispatched. Likewise, the citation simply ignores the presence of the soldiers and advisors who actually 'captured the enemy weapons' and routed the Viet Cong ... [and] that Kerry attacked a 'numerically superior force in the face of intense fire' is simply false. There was little or no fire after Kerry followed the plan. ... The lone, wounded, fleeing young Viet Cong in a loincloth was hardly a force superior to the heavily armed Swift Boat and its crew and the soldiers carried aboard."

The book says if Kerry's superior officers knew the truth, they would never have recommended the award

O'Neill writes: "Admiral Roy Hoffmann, who sent a Bravo Zulu (meaning "good work"), to Kerry upon learning of the incident, was very surprised to discover in 2004 what had actually occurred. Hoffmann had been told that Kerry had spontaneously beached next to the bunker and almost single—handedly routed a bunkered force in Viet Cong. He was shocked to find out that Kerry had beached his boat second in a preplanned operation, and that he had killed a single, wounded teenage foe as he fled.

"Commander Geoge Elliott, who wrote up the initial draft of Kerry's Silver Star citation, confirms that neither he, nor anyone else in the Silver Star process that he knows, realized before 1996 that Kerry was facing a single, wounded young Viet Cong fleeing in a loincloth. While Commander Elliott and many other Swiftees believe that Kerry committed no crime in killing the fleeing, wounded enemy (with a loaded or empty launcher), others feel differently. Commander Elliott indicates that a Silver Star recommendation would not have been made by him had he been aware of the actual facts."

Steve Gilbert  9 14 04