It appears that time is running short when it comes to the question of whether China will attack Taiwan. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, a Chinese victory is not inevitable. If regional nations and other, more powerful countries are willing to think outside the box, there may be a way to settle the matter, despite China’s history of refusing to abide by the international agreements it signs.

The Chinese will surely wish to attack during the tenure of the Biden administration for three reasons:

1. Joe Biden is in Chairman Xi’s pocket.

2. China is ready now, while the USA is not.

3. All Pentagon war games show China victorious.

Given the advantages that China has, is it still possible to resolve this crisis without war?

China wants dominion over Taiwan; Taiwan wants self-government. There would seem to be no common ground for settlement. Yet the true ground for settlement is the existence of uncertainty.

Is China facing any uncertainty?

Yes, China does face uncertainty, and the fact that China has not yet seized Taiwan is solid evidence that Chairman Xi is acutely aware of this uncertainty.

What is this uncertainty? Simply this: Although it might seem objectively clear that China will emerge from a Taiwan War victorious over the US and Taiwan and whoever else dares engage, it is also objectively clear that China herself will not emerge unscathed. China will pay a price.

A missile exchange with the US will undoubtedly send many People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) capital ships to the bottom and may well punish PLA facilities on the mainland. If the Taiwanese were to fight as they talk, seizing Taiwan would end with Taiwan’s infrastructure being significantly destroyed, undermining the value of Taiwan as the prize.

Thus, a Chinese victory will come with a price. Is dominion over Taiwan worth that price? Could dominion be achieved without paying that price? Is there a path without war that would both give China sufficient dominion and Taiwan sufficient liberty to forge a settlement?

YouTube screen grab (edited).

Moreover, is a Chinese victory really assured? The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ran the Battle of Taiwan war game 24 times, seeking to answer two fundamental questions: (1) Would the Chinese win and (2) At what cost? Their answers, unlike the Pentagon’s, are (1) “No!” and (2) “Enormous!”

CSIS’s wargaming predicts, “The US Navy loses two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface ships. …China loses 155 combat aircraft,138 major ships, and 10,000 troops.”

So, there is some uncertainty. And uncertainty means settlement is possible. China wants dominion over Taiwan, and Taiwan wants self-government, meaning the rule of law under a constitution and laws enacted by elected representatives.

China loves to claim that it favors a “rules-based” international order. Could China be moved to accept a “rules-based” government in Taiwan? Would it be possible for China to reach an agreement with Taiwan, Japan, the USA, the Philippines, and others, on a constitution for Taiwan and allow Taiwan to be self-governing under this constitution?

This brings us to the case of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s transition on July 1, 1997, from British rule to Chinese rule could have been a shining example of international cooperation and Chinese liberality had China not reneged on the treaty consummating the “handover” of Hong Kong to China.

The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 was the treaty that set forth the conditions and provisions of the handover, an executive summary of which would be that Hong Kong would become an autonomous Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China and, for a period of fifty years, would retain its common law and capitalist systems, would soon allow universal suffrage. These and many other assurances were to be expressed in a constitution of Hong Kong, called the “Basic Law of Hong Kong” that The National People’s Congress of China would enact, which it did on April 4, 1990. Article 45 of the Basic Law provides that “the ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive of Hong Kong by universal suffrage,” and Article 68 provides that “the ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong by universal suffrage.”

Immediately after the handover, pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong began agitating to implement the promise of universal suffrage. Seventeen years later, on August 31, 2014, the issue came to a head with a decision by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) that the next Chief Executive election in Hong Kong would allow universal suffrage. But that decision was a scam, so hedged about with conditions and provisos that it made universal suffrage actually impossible, with power and control remaining in Beijing. As explained by Hong Kong writer Kong Tsung-Gan in Umbrella, “The NPCSC ruling of 31 August 2014 said it was allowing HK to proceed to universal suffrage while imposing such restrictions as to leave its version of universal suffrage so divergent from international law as to be anything but.”

This scam resulted in massive protest demonstrations, totally shutting down the city center. This, in turn, led to China’s National People’s Congress enacting the crackdown embodied in the Hong Kong National Security Law of June 30, 2020.

In addition to the Chinese reneging on their promises to Hong Kong, the case of Philippines v. China also shows that China cannot be trusted to honor and comply with treaties or to follow international law.

Philippines v. China was an international law action that the Philippines brought on January 22, 2013, before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. In it, the Philippines complained that the nine-dash line that China placed on maps to assert territorial control over nearly all of the South China Sea violated the UN Convention On The Law Of The Sea (UNCLOS).

China’s defense wasn’t substantive but procedural. It held that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over China because China had not signed the Convention. On July 12, 2016, the PCA ruled that China had signed the Convention, that the PCA had jurisdiction over China, and that China’s claims to waters within the “9-dash line” had no legal basis and hence no legal effect.

China denounced the ruling and ignored it.

Given China’s history of ignoring past agreements and defying international law, how does one enforce a treaty with China other than by war?

While this is above my pay grade, here is a suggestion: Find a method of applying economic pain to China for noncompliance. To get there, let the settlement treaty be one not just between China and Taiwan but, instead, a treaty among numerous signatories. The treaty’s terms would hold that, if the Permanent Court of Arbitration finds China in non-compliance, then each of the signatories will apply a specified economic sanction against China. There are, of course, six ways from Sunday to arrange the details of that, and success will depend entirely upon the negotiators' grit, determination, charm, insight, and creativity.

Can it be done? I hope so.