Most Americans and other observers around the world are still trying to figure out what happened last week in Russia and what it portends for the future. Why did the Russian mercenary force known as the Wagner Group march almost all the way to Moscow, then suddenly stop “to avoid bloodshed” and make a deal? What does it mean for Putin and Russia’s future? Why was the head of the Wagner Group, former criminal Yevgeny Prigozhin, allowed to go into exile in neighboring Belarus? While there is a lot that is still murky, a more complete picture is starting to emerge. Even though official charges against Prigozhin have reportedly been dropped, many already speculate that his days are numbered, and that may very well be true:  over the years, Putin has destroyed many other potential rivals or threats to his regime for far less. But events in a mafia-state often proceed along a different pathway than what most Westerners might expect.

Prigozhin has emphasized that his goal with this little ‘rebellion’ was to make a point and to appeal to Putin -- not to oppose him.  And make a point he did! While Russians and the rest of the world were shocked at his lightning advance from Rostov-on-Don to the outskirts of the capital, his life-or-death gamble was entirely in character for a brutal but respected thug who has a flair for the dramatic.  The man who was once known as “Putin’s chef” developing exotic dishes for Russian elites is also known for executing deserters from his ‘prisoner-for-hire’ group with a sledgehammer.

There are still many moving parts to what is now happening in Russia, but the bottom line is that Putin’s power and authority are now much diminished prior to what they were before Prigozhin’s ‘non-insurrection’ insurrection.  If Putin were working from a position of strength, he certainly would not have denounced Wagner soldiers as traitors and betrayers one day and then worked out a deal with them the next.  If Russian military forces right now were in good shape, Prigozhin and much of the Wagner leadership would probably have been lined up and shot and the rest sent back to prison (which is where many of them came from originally). But the Russian military is not good shape -- it is under great stress, which is one of the reasons Prigozhin rebelled (along with the fact that some of his forces then in Ukraine were purportedly fired upon with missile attacks from the regular Russian military -- which, if true, would be deliberate fratricide). Meanwhile, we have senior Russian generals ‘disappearing’ and rumors of a purge -- not exactly a vote of confidence in the leadership of the military.

The reality is that Russia still has uses for the Wagner Group, both at home and abroad, although it has clearly become more trouble than it is worth as presently constituted. Putin’s people clearly can’t control it anymore, which is why the deal with Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to take Prigozhin and the Wagnerites in makes so much sense. It was a deal that may have been struck by Aleksey Dyumin, a former Putin bodyguard and current governor of Tula Oblast -- the area through which Prigozhin’s forces were moving as they approached Moscow. Dyumin knows all the players.

Wagnerites have been offered the opportunity to either:  join Prigozhin in Belarus, go back to their homes in Russia, or sign contracts and officially join the Russian military. I don’t think many will choose the latter. Without Prigozhin’s protection, most will have no desire to become cannon fodder in Ukraine or to be viewed as dangerous and untrustworthy by their fellow soldiers and commanders -- marked men, in other words. Signing a military contract is probably a non-starter for most of them, unless they’re desperate.

Many probably have no home to go to back in Russia. A great number of them were recruited by Prigozhin right out of prison. Most remain fiercely loyal to Prigozhin personally. The most dedicated will likely try to join him in Belarus. Perhaps some will sign on with other smaller mercenary groups or disappear into crime gangs or other organizations within Russia as experienced ‘guns-for-hire’.

Sending the Wagner Group to Belarus without destroying it entirely solves several problems.

Lukashenko, according to press reporting, is already saying that the Wagner Group will, “at a minimum,” advise and consult the Belarusian military. Such a move preserves battled-hardened veterans that Russia might later want to call on again in its war in Ukraine. It solves the military command and control problem that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) had with Prigozhin. It strengthens Belarusian military expertise at little or no cost to Russia. Both sides -- Russia and Belarus -- are in each other’s debt for the deal. But how will all of this impact the war in Ukraine?

In the short run, Russian military strength in Russian-occupied areas in the south of Ukraine where there is current fighting has been diminished by the withdrawal of Wagner forces. Hopefully, Ukraine’s counteroffensive will soon make great gains during this time of uncertainty. Will Russia be able to hold onto Crimea? I believe that Crimea is now in play in this horrible war, which to this day cannot legally be called “a war” within Russia itself.

Putin desperately needs some sort of victory to strengthen his grip on power. This is where Belarus and the Wagner Group come in. The Wagner Group’s time spent in southern Ukraine -- they reportedly sustained enormous casualties against Ukrainian fighters in the fighting around Bakhmut -- had already run its course. Prigozhin himself was clearly sick to death of Russian MOD excuses and failures to adequately support his forces. By removing Wagner forces to Belarus, Russia could potentially later open up a new strategic front against Ukraine. The biggest prize of the war, of course, remains Ukraine’s capital, Kiev (Kyiv).  It seems unlikely at this point that Russia could mount a successful offensive to take the city, but having substantial Wagner forces in Belarus (if that does occur) could alter the calculus of war somewhat and push Ukraine to divert additional forces to protect the capital. Ironically, Kiev is just about the same distance from the Belarusian border as Wagner Group forces were from entering Moscow when Prigozhin halted their advance!

The Prigozhin-Wagner episode has revealed many fault lines in the current power structure in Russia.  Putin’s power will likely continue to diminish without a major victory in Ukraine, which seems increasingly unlikely. He will likely become even more repressive within Russia as he feels his power slipping away. We could be witnessing the early stages of what will eventually emerge as the post-Putin era.

A.J. Melnick is a former Pentagon Soviet/Russian affairs analyst.

Image: Noorullah21