At 5:00 A.M. on July 14, 2004, I happened to be on the road and noticed a small glow on the hill just above Carson City, Nev.  I called our fire management officer (FMO).  He said they were hiking someone in to size up the fire, and it would take an hour or so to assess the situation.  I asked if we had any aircraft or fire crews in route.  He said the pilots were not available, as they normally don't start their day until later in the morning.  Several hours later, a single-engine air tanker and pilot were available and made a drop.

A couple of hours after that, two additional drops were made.  By this time, though, the fire had potential to spread significantly and threaten several neighborhoods, so we ordered a team to come to the area and manage the fire.  While we were transitioning fire leadership to the new team, the Waterfall Fire, as it was named, came roaring off the hill and burned over a dozen vehicles.  By the grace of G-d, no one was injured or killed.  The next day, it burned the side of our house and burned eight of our neighbors' homes to the ground.  The total suppression and rehabilitation cost, excluding private property damage, was in excess of thirty million dollars (small by today's standards).

After the fire, I was asked to speak to my fellow district rangers across the intermountain west on what we could have done differently.  I spoke about the foolishness of transitioning in the middle of the day, about not fully calling out the potential danger of the vehicles in the cul-de-sac to our fire management officer, the value of a hazardous fuels treatment in saving a nearby neighborhood, etc.

Knowing what I know now, I wish I could give that talk again.  Unfortunately, since the Waterfall Fire, I have seen variations of this situation repeat itself on numerous occasions. 

Almost ninety percent of all fires are human starts, and they are generally the most devastating.  Catching fires early is usually safer than the exposure created by thousands of firefighters and multiple aircraft suppressing a project fire that was not caught.  (Most fatalities are transportation, often fatigue-related, not burn-overs.)  Admittedly, there are wildfires where the safest response may be to monitor the fire – for example, isolated trees burning in a rocky area or a wilderness fire, especially later in the fall when snow is expected.  If even a little more attention is given to these simple front-end recommendations, wildfire impacts will be reduced and firefighter safety enhanced. 

Thankfully, on August 16, the secretary of agriculture and the interim U.S. Forest Service chief, supported by a bipartisan group of senators, committed the agency to work closely with the nation's state foresters to significantly increase and focus their combined resources to treat hazardous fuels both mechanically and with prescribed fire on the highest risk forested areas.  This is indeed critical work in reducing the impacts from wildfires, protecting communities, and providing safer conditions for firefighters to work.  Importantly, in addition, the secretary and the chief called on the states and federal forest fire managers to work together on implementing the latest technology and aligning their initial attack strategies and efforts.

Here are six recommendations that could vastly improve federal, state, and local firefighting effectiveness; lower costs; and improve firefighter and public safety. 

1. We know the causes and demographics of human fire starts.  As one example, we know that almost thirty percent of wildfire starts are a result of debris burning.  How do we target that demographic and work with states and communities on developing and enforcing ordinances?  The critical message is this: whether it is human starts due to debris burning, abandoned campfires, arcing power lines, or off-road vehicles, there need to be targeted analyses and focused; meaningful; and, to the extent possible, measurable outreach and prevention efforts.  Smokey is excellent for general awareness, but focused efforts are needed. 
2. Many states during times of extreme fire danger are using infrared detection flights to find smoldering campfires or lightning holdovers.  Can this be standard operating procedure?  Imagine if we had discovered this fire earlier or many others, such as California's Sobranes Fire, which ended up costing some 250 million dollars to suppress.  Infra-red detection flights should be SOP during times of extreme fire danger in areas of greatest concern.
3. Can we greatly expand the use of drones to size up fires?  Fire management officers should have drones at their disposal in order to size up fires quickly, safely, and accurately.  A number of state partners already possess this capability. 
4. Why are some of the pilots on federal and state contracts not available to be in the air at the crack of dawn before the ground heats up and the winds kick up?  Agencies should re-examine aerial firefighting in terms of earlier and more effective delivery of water, suppressants and retardants, as well as safety.  Again, some states have made such arrangements. 
5. A number of states have made tracking devices standard protocol for all deployed firefighters so they can view their whereabouts with live mapping and determine if an approaching wildfire will threaten their safety.  Tracking devices are available off the shelf.  They should be required for all actively deployed firefighters. 
6. After Action Reviews need to begin with a detailed assessment of what could have been done to prevent, detect, or suppress the wildfire in its infancy.  Many times, the AAR occurs before the cause is formally established.  Nevertheless, everyone on the fire is generally aware of what caused the ignition and about where it took place.  For the purposes of the AAR, those leading the review need to make assumptions based on best available information.  Line officers and fire managers need to insist that After Action Reviews delve much more deeply into the prevention, detection, and initial attack aspects of the wildfire effort. 

I am optimistic that federal and state firefighting partners will move forward with increasing alacrity to address wildfire challenges and consider implementing these and other front-end recommendations.  Given the leaders' intent we heard from the secretary, the chief, and the nation's state foresters, I am hopeful that we will ultimately see many more potential "Waterfall Fires" prevented, detected, or caught early and safer conditions for our nation's firefighters. 

This article comprises the personal views of Gary Schiff, retiring policy director, National Association of State Foresters.  He was previously employed for over three decades by U.S. Forest Service in a variety of capacities, including district ranger, based in Carson City, Nevada.