Forget the Executive Summary which is a collection of platitudes and wish-lists.  If the assumptions in the Executive Summary were true - for instance that Iraq's neighbors see themselves as having a stake in a stable and successful Iraq - the problem would have been solved long ago and our troops would be home.

But ...the next section - "Assessment" - is an effective and hard-hitting summary of the situation in Iraq as of now.  And it isn't pretty.  Having read Dr. Richard Feynman's  droll narrative of the writing of the Challenger disaster report back in the 1980's (Dr. Feynman was the Nobel Price-winning physicist from Caltech who identified the Challenger problem as being the brittleness of the rocket seals when they got cold), I assume that the Executive Summary and the Assessment were written by different people.

The police force is a disaster, essentially a Shia militia.  The army has extensive absenteeism and uncertain leadership.  Operation Together Forward II to secure Baghdad has been a failure.  One wonders if the Bush Administration and the Pentagon have been getting reports of this directness from the field and if they have, what has been the basis for their confidence about success in Iraq over the past year?

There is an excellent summary of the political situation, which basically concludes that while there is some lip-service given to national reconciliation, the Kurds and the Shia would prefer autonomous regions while the Sunni are bereft of an economically viable base, and thus desiring a strong central government, but only if they run it, which democratic arithmetic prevents!

Here is the money paragraph on security:

"The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation.  Shiite leaders must make the decision to demobilize militias.  Sunni Arabs must make the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through violent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda."

"We continue to expect the Korean Peninsula to remain peaceful so long as North Korea is not directed by an isolated Stalinist regime" when the entire problem is that North Korea is directed by an isolated Stalinist regime.

"Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda.  Each side watches the other.  Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia militias are disarmed.  Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed.  To put it simply: there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms."

"The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic services: electricity; drinking water, sewage, health care, and education.  In many sectors, production is below or hovers around prewar levels.  In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the situation is much worse.  There are five major reasons for this problem. [emphasis added]

"First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian basis.  For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of Shi-governed Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and trash piles are waist-high.  One American official told us that Baghdad is run like a ‘Shia dictatorship' because Sunnis boycotted provincial elections in 2005, aqnd therefore are not represented in local government.

"Second, security is lacking: insurgents target key infrastructure.  For instance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made.

"Third, corruption is rampant.  One senior Iraqi official estimated that official corruption costs Iraq $5 - 7 billion per year.  Notable steps have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit board and inspectors general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime Minister have identified rooting out corruption as a national priority.  But too many political leaders still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests.  There are still no examples of senior officials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges.

"Fourth, capacity is inadequate.  Most of Iraq's technocratic class was pushed out of government as part of de-Baathification.  Other skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has risen.  Too often, Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as political spoils.  Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries, spending as little as 10 - 15 percent of their capital budget.  They lack technical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, a banking system that does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensive red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry of Finance reluctant to disburse funds.

"Fifth, the judiciary is weak.  Much has been done to establish an Iraqi judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicated judges.  But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function.  Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless.  As one senior U.S. official said to us, ‘We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended families, their friends.'  Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded." [emphasis added]

"The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective [italics added].  There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of reconstruction."