Putin's dangerous game with Iran
Russian is continuing to play a very dangerous game with Iran's nuclear weapons program. If there ever has has been more obfuscation and technical misinformation about a rogue nation's nuclear program than Iran's, I can't think of it. According to the Deutsche Press via M&C News, Iran's nuclear delegation spokesman Javad Vaeidi said that Iran had accepted the Russian proposal to limit Teheran's ability to enrich uranium. The article said that,
Based on the Russian proposal, which is backed by the European Union, United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would be allowed to convert uranium at home in the Isfahan plant before sending the uranium to Russia for enrichment, in order to prevent any Iranian misuse of the enrichment process for producing atomic weapons material.
There is some doubt that an official proposal has been made by Russia, but if this is the true substance of the agreement, it is in fact, another retreat by Putin and the IAEA.
There is no reason for Iran to continue the conversion process and then go to the trouble to ship the converted yellowcake to Russia for enrichment. Enriched uranium was already being manufactured at the Novosibirsk nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Siberia for use in Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor. The spent fuel was then supposed to be shipped back to Russia for reprocessing. This was also a suspicious arrangement, since the spent fuel was to be kept in cooling ponds in Iran for ten years, which is not technically required, but would certainly give the mullahs plenty of opportunity to take advantage of the IAEA's flawed inspection regime. That is, the longer it stays in Iran, the greater the chance it could be diverted for use in weapons development.
This earlier deal with Russia was fraught with danger, but the US publicly backed the arrangement in the hopes that Putin could keep some level of control on the mullahs' access to nuclear material. If the US supports this newest proposal as the article says, then we must assume that we are resigned to a nuclear Iran, and will now rely on covert and overt military measures to pressure the mullahs and/or destroy key nuclear facilities.
The Russia — Iran Nuclear Pact is a logical outcome of the desperation of the former socialist nation. Russia and the EU are trying to revitalize their moribund economies by selling nuclear materials and providing atomic technical expertise to oil rich dictators. For Russia, additional pressure in the form of Iranian trained Chechen terrorists will only increase the motivation to solidify its nuclear pact with Iran.
And despite Russia's abundance of natural resources, Putin has seen the handwriting on the wall when a nation opts to join the US—led alliance against global terrorism in southern Asia. Because of India's pro—US vote in the IAEA Board Governors, Iran canceled its long sought—after gas pipeline deal with New Delhi. Fortunately, the US had already agreed to help build up India's military and to provide technical assistance to assure the huge country of energy sufficient for decades to come.
Russia may be in such dire straights that it will cease to exist as a viable nation. For some reason though, it continues to make deals with Islamo—fascist dictators, instead of moving towards better relations with the US and its allies in the War on Terror. One would think Putin would ditch his decades—old Soviet geo—political playbook — and soon.
Douglas Hanson is the national security correspondent of The American Thinker.