A complete commentary on the same-sex marriage case would take far more than a single short article. Accordingly, I offer only some discrete thoughts:

• A big expansion of federal power. Many libertarians believe the courts should use the Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights unenumerated in the Constitution, and some urged the Court to declare that civil marriage was among those rights. They need to be careful what they ask for. What they have just “won” is a major expansion of federal power.

The case removes limitations on Substantive Due Process, the principal way judges create “rights” unmentioned by the Constitution. Removal of those limits augments the authority of the federal courts. But it also widens the power of Congress. Whenever the courts create a new right under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 of that amendment operates to give Congress “power to enforce [it], by appropriate legislation.” As a result of this case, Congress now enjoys substantial authority over civil marriage, a realm previously considered to be almost wholly reserved to the states.

• The Court’s principal flaw in logic. This is my summary of the essence of the holding:

We recognize marriage as a fundamental constitutional right because it is so important to personal fulfillment, so long-honored, and creates such good social results. Hence, we now require states to loosen the prerequisites for marriage.

The flaw in this assertion is assuming that the “marriage” that has been such as successful institution is the same thing as “marriage” under the Court’s redefinition. An institution whose essence is a relationship between people of the opposite sex is not the same thing as an institution without that characteristic. We do not know what the long-term results of the latter might be.

• The radical result. I could be persuaded to the contrary, but the case has me thinking it may be the most radical in Supreme Court history. An obvious reason is the result: the Court constitutionalized a pop-definition that didn’t exist 20 years ago. Speaking jurisprudentially (although not morally), this was a much greater departure than such widely-criticized Substantive Due Process cases as Dred Scott, Lochner v. New York, or Roe v. Wade.

Rob Natelson, a retired constitutional law professor, is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute. His research is frequently cited at the Supreme Court, both by justices and by parties.

• The radical methodology. (1) The Court did not, as is customary, rest its holding on the most narrow grounds supporting the result, but on the widest possible grounds -- i.e., Substantive Due Process rather than Equal Protection or Full Faith and Credit. (2) The Court announced explicitly that even the prior flaccid limits on Substantive Due Process no longer applied. (3) The Court’s own precedents required that after a judge finds a right “legitimate” or “important” or (as here) “fundamental,” the judge next must consider the weight of the government’s justification for limiting the right. But the Court didn’t even purport to do the latter. In other words, the Court granted same sex marriage a status above enumerated fundamental rights (such as free speech) and other unenumerated rights (such as privacy or abortion).

• Yet, constitutionally speaking, civil marriage is not a “right” at all, much less a fundamental one. As Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent, civil marriage is what the Founders called a “privilege” -- a government-created entitlement. Same-sex couples have the right to cohabit without being molested by the state, to contract with each other, and to take religious vows. Neither they nor anyone else has the “right” to the government-created entitlement called civil marriage.

Civil marriage does not create the right to cohabit. It is principally a vehicle for distribution of certain special benefits. The first-named plaintiff could have married his long-term partner any time after Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in 2003, but he did so only after his partner was critically ill and inheritance became an issue. The Court’s description of the facts strongly suggests that as to that plaintiff at least, the case was as much about entitlement as about love.

• Are you religious? Be afraid. The Court’s opinion shows the justices know their holding has grave implications for the free exercise of religion, but the paragraph in the opinion that purports to reassure does not. Pointedly, it mentions only the freedom to dissent and debate on matters of religion and morality, not the freedom to act on ones views. In the wake of this decision, family businesses, non-profits and perhaps even religious congregations will be sued under state and federal civil rights laws. This opinion implies the Court will do nothing to relieve them.

 • Hypocrisy. Some of same voices that urged “restraint” in considering ObamaCare because it was (just barely) adopted pursuant to the democratic process, urged the Court to sweep away scores of democratically-adopted laws that reflect long popular understanding. Consider the disparate approaches by editors of Time Magazine, for example -- for restraint in the ObamaCare case, but against restraint in this one.

 • Constitutional corruption. As Justice Alito pointed out in dissent, this holding exemplifies how corrupted constitutional interpretation has become. Justice Alito did not mention, but probably would agree, that the nation’s law schools are largely to blame. Lawmakers and alumni: Take note next time universities with law schools ask for money.

• “Same ole same ole” won’t cure the problem. Justice Alito also noted the futility of past efforts to address this corruption. That’s one reason we need a convention to propose amendments under Article V of the Constitution. Those who have been arguing that traditional methods of response are sufficient have been thumpingly proven wrong.

Rob Natelson, a retired constitutional law professor, is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute. His research is frequently cited at the Supreme Court, both by justices and by parties.